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impartial jury. Therefore, so long as the jury which is empanel-
ed is impartial, there is no constitutional violation. The nine
peremptory challenges allowed in capital cases heard in
Oklahoma are created by statute and are not required by the
Constitution. The "right" to a peremptory challenge is only
denied if the defendant does not receive that which is provided
under the statute, the petitioner was allowed to use his nine
challenges, therefore, there was no denial of this "right."
The Court held that even though the trial court did err by
not excusing juror Huling for cause, this error did not impair
the petitioner's right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Con-
stitution. The decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals was affirmed.
DISSENT
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackman and
Stevens, opened his dissent by stating that "A man's life is at
stake. We should not be playing games." There is no debate
whether or not the trial court erred when it refused to strike the
juror, it was error and the dissent feels reversible error. The
loss of this peremptory challenge did affect the make up of the
impaneled jury. There is no way to determine that the composi-
tion of that jury would have been the same if the defendant
had not used this challenge. The issue is not whether the error
was "corrected" by the challenge, rather, the trial court erred
and this error could have had a significant affect on the jury
ultimately impaneled.
The dissent relied on, Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. -,
-, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2055, 95 L.Ed.ed 622 (1987), where the
Court found there was a Sixth Amendment violation requiring
the resentencing of the defendant in a capital case if "the com-
position of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been
affected by the trial court's error." In Ross the trial court,
rather than exclude a qualified juror, refused to excuse a biased
juror. The defense attempted to correct the court's error by us-
ing a peremptory challenge and argued this deprivation fell
within the Sixth Amendment protection outlined in Gray. The
dissent therefore concluded that the result reached by the ma-
jority was in direct contradiction with the holding in Gray.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Virginia permits only four peremptory challenges, and the
jury selection process virtually ensures they will all be used. A
similar error, like the one committed by the trial court in Ross,
would require a Virginia defendant to use one fourth of his
peremptory strikes to correct that error. If a Ross situation
arises, there may be insufficient peremptory strikes to remove
all prospective jurors whom the defense has unsuccessfully
challenged for cause. In any event, Ross suggests that defense
counsel should; a) use all peremptory strikes, b) ask for more,
c) identify one juror who is to sit that would have been stricken
if a peremptory strike were available, d) note and preserve the
objection on both federal and state grounds. (Elizabeth P.
Murtagh)
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FACTS
Donald Franklin was accused of capital murder of a woman
who had been abducted, stabbed, robbed, and possibly raped,
and who subsequently died of her wounds in a hospital.
Franklin was convicted of capital murder, Franklin v. State, 693
SW2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) and sentenced to death
under the Texas Special Issue sentencing scheme. The jury at
Franklin's sentencing trial answered two special issues: 1)
whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Franklin's conduct causing the death was committed deliberately
and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the decas-
ed or another could result, and 2) whether the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability that
Franklin would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society. Affirmative answers to
the two issues would automatically require imposition of the
death penalty. Franklin's only proffered mitigating evidence was
his good conduct while in jail before and after the crime.
Franklin's requested instructions, which were not given,
specified that any mitigating evidence should be taken into ac-
count when answering the Special Issues.
The Court of Criminal Apeal of Texas affirmed the judg-
ment. Franklin v. Texas, 693 SW2d 420 (1985, Tex. Crim.).
Franklin petitioned for habeas corpus relief based on a claim
that the two special issues, absent his requested instructions, un-
constitutionally limited the jury's consideration of mitigating
evidence. (See summary of Mills v. Maryland, Supra at p. ).
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas denied Franklin's petition. Franklin v. Texas, 475 U.S.
1031 (1986). In the subsequent habeas petition, certiorari was
granted in part by Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. 221 (1987),
and affirmed by this case.
HOLDING
a) Residual doubts as to the defendant's identity, responsibility
for the death, and intent to cause death as mitigating
circumstances.
Franklin claimed that the instructions and special issues did
not provide sufficient opportunity for the jury to consider
whatever residual doubts it may have had about Franklin's
guilt. The three doubts delineated were 1) Franklin's identity as
the murderer, 2) actual cause of death, and 3) Franklin's intent
to act in a way so as to cause death.
As to the first possible doubt, the court, in a plurality opi-
nion by Justice White, stated that a defendant has never had a
constitutional right to have a jury instruction requiring that the
jury revisit the question of identity. 108 S.Ct. at 2326. Even if
such a right existed, the court continued, it was not violated
here-the trial court made no active limitation against such con-
sideration by the jury. Id., at 2327. As an aside, the court
noted that Franklin's "requested instructions on mitigating
evidence themselves offered no specific direction to the jury
concerning the potential consideration of 'residual doubt."' Id.
As to the second and third concerns, the Court found that
consideration of these was not limited either; in fact, Special
Issue One, regarding deliberate conduct with the reasonable ex-
pectation that death would occur, specifically required the jury
to look at intent and deliberateness of actions. Id., at 2328.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Blackmun, firmly stated that residual doubt is not a
mitigating circumstance. Id., at 2334.
b) Independent consideration of mitigating factor of good
disciplinary record during periods of incarceration.
Secondly, Franklin claimed that the instructions given did
not allow the jury to give adequate weight to the mitigating
evidence of Franklin's good behavior while in prison.
Once again the court found these concerns answered in the
Special Issues. "In resolving the second Texas Special Issue the
jury was surely free to weigh and evaluate petitioner's
disciplinary record as it bore on his 'character'-that is, his
'character' as measured by his likely future behavior." Id., at
2329. The court also noted that Franklin's case was phrased in
terms of relevancy to future dangerousness. Id.
In the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that con-
finement of consideration to the special verdict question did not
interfere with presentation or effect of mitigating evidence,
because "the stipulation [regarding good conduct in jail] had no
relevance to any other aspect of petitioner's character" besides
future dangerousness. Id., at 2333.
In dissent, however, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, stated that mitigating evidence concerning
the defendant's good behavior while incarcerated is relevant in-
dependently of future dangerousness and that the instructions
failed to afford this evidence its proper weight. Id., at 2336,
citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1 (1987). In particular, the dissent noted that "[p]ast
conduct often provides insights into a person's character that
will evoke a merciful response to a demand for the ultimate
punishment even though it may shed no light on what may hap-
pen in the future." Id.
The dissent also noted that it is not permissible to channel
jury discretion in capital sentencing by foreclosing jury con-
sideration of relevant mitigating evidences, including aspects of
defendant's character unrelated to good conduct while in-
carcerated. Id.
c) Constitutionality of Texas sentencing scheme.
Franklin's third claim was that the jury, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, was not afforded an opportunity to give
independent mitigating weight to the circumstances he
presented, apart from the special issues. The court found that
the claim that the jury was unconstitutionally limited by the
special issues was foreclosed by Jurek v. Texas, "which held
that Texas could constitutionally impose the death penalty if a
jury returned "Yes" answers to the two Special Issues." Id., at
2330.
The court added that notlng precludes the state from
establishing a sentencing framework, adding that Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), requires death penalty statutes to
be structured so as to prevent arbitrary and unpredictable ad-
ministration of the death penalty. Id., at 2331.
Franklin was executed on November 3, 1988.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Virginia's capital sentencing scheme is described in Virginia
Code §§ 19.2-264.3 and 19.2-264.4. Although Virginia employs
an aggravating factor of future dangerousness, unlike Texas,
Virginia juries are free to fix a sentence of life imprisonment
even if one or both of the statutory aggravating factors are
found to exist. Juries, of course, should be reminded of this.
Also, it is not the usual practice in Virginia to inform juries
of statutory mitigating factors. It is, therefore, important to
stress that the jury is free to consider any mitigating cir-
cumstance in the final sentencing procedure, and that the jury
be informed of the thrust of Lockett, Eddings, and Skipper.
The dissent noted in particular the "rigorously enforced"
rule of mitigating evidence in capital sentencing:
A sentencing jury must be given the
authority to reject the imposition of the death
penalty on the basis of any evidence relevant
to the defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense proffered by the
defendant in support of a sentence less than
death. That rule does not merely require that
the jury be allowed to hear any such evidence
the defendant desires to introduce, Skipper v
South Carolina, 476 U.S. at 4 (1978), it also
requires that the jury be allowed to give "in-
dependent mitigating weight" to the evidence.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112-113
(1982). Id., at 2336.
If this information is clearly presented in the jury instruc-
tions, confusion as to the scope and weight of mitigating fac-
tors may not occur. (Helen Bishop)
